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V. STATES SHOULD MANDATE METRO-WIDE DESEGREGATION
CONSISTENT WITH KENNEDY’S GUIDANCE IN PARENTS
INVOLVED ................................................................................ 973
America must realize that purging the taint of racism
requires more than color blindness and race neutrality in
a free market. Color-blind remedies are also blind to the
historical fact that the law sanctioned racial oppression for
centuries. Because blacks suffered and whites prospered
as classes, any realistic remedy must also be classbased. . . . America must reject out of hand any policies
1
that tend to separate the races.
In June 2007, the United States Supreme Court came within
one vote of ending school integration and moving to the type of
race-neutral, free-market remedy to educational inequality that
2
Judge Gerald W. Heaney warned against in 1985. The nonbinding portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1
asserts that states may only remedy racial imbalance in its schools
caused by intentional discrimination, and proactive efforts to
3
integrate schools racially should be left to parental choice. But the
majority of the Supreme Court still endorses mandatory, proactive
4
Justice Kennedy’s
strategies to prevent resegregation.
concurrence in Parents Involved acknowledges that race-conscious
decision-making is still necessary and rejects the plurality’s
5
colorblind approach. Kennedy’s opinion provides at least limited
1. Gerald W. Heaney, Busing, Timetables, Goals, and Ratios: Touchstones of
Equal Opportunity, 69 MINN. L. REV. 735, 819–20 (1985). Authors Hobday and
Orfield clerked for the Honorable Gerald W. Heaney, whose cautionary words still
provide guidance today. This article is a tribute to Heaney, the fine jurist who
oversaw the school desegregation cases in St. Louis and Kansas City during his
tenure on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Judge Heaney has also coauthored a history of the St. Louis case. See GERALD W. HEANEY & SUSAN
UCHITELLE, UNENDING STRUGGLE: THE LONG ROAD TO AN EQUAL EDUCATION IN ST.
LOUIS (2004).
2. The non-controlling portions of Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion
in Parents Involved expressed the belief that states do not have a “compelling
interest” in racially balanced schools under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
127 S. Ct. 2738, 2757 (2007).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 2791–92, 2811–20 (Kennedy, J., concurring, Breyer, J., dissenting)
(Justice Breyer is joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg).
5. Id. at 2791–92 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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6

avenues for states to address racial isolation in their schools,
including the explicit consideration of race in the drawing of
attendance boundaries and in the decisions to open and close
7
schools. The Court’s holding, therefore, does not require school
districts to resort to choice-based integration programs. Yet, a
growing number of states have been moving in that direction in the
8
wake of declining court oversight over desegregation programs.
While educational choice can serve some public good, there is
reason to be cautious about integration plans that rely heavily on
9
the voluntary decision-making of local school boards and parents.
Nearly ten years ago, Minnesota adopted choice-based school
integration rules. The results have been disastrous. Minnesota, the
10
11
land of Hubert Humphrey and Roy Wilkins, a state with a
6. Adopting Justice Kennedy’s articulation of the states’ compelling interest
in addressing racial isolation, this article speaks primarily in terms of “racial
isolation” and “racial balance” to describe the state of Minnesota schools. In
doing so, we do not accept that racial balance, or desegregation, is the same thing
as integration. This is Justice Thomas’s view in Parents Involved. Id. at 2769 n.2
(Thomas, J., concurring). True integration of public schools requires much more
than numerical balancing of schools’ racial compositions. See, e.g., John A. Powell,
The Tensions Between Integration and School Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 655, 681
(2001) (“Educational integration is the systemic transformation of a school to
create a diverse and inclusive environment within the school and the curricula,
achieved through a variety of reforms.”). But the elimination of racially isolated
schools—having schools with racial compositions that better reflect our racially
diverse society—is a first and necessary step for metropolitan districts concerned
with integrating their schools. Id. (“‘We must always be aware of the fact that our
ultimate goal is integration, and that desegregation is only a first step on the road
to the good society . . . .’”) (quoting MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., THE ETHICAL
DEMANDS FOR INTEGRATION (1962)).
7. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8. GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 20–22 (1996); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Susan
Eaton, From Little Rock to Seattle and Louisville: Is “All Deliberate Speed” Stuck in
Reverse?, 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 279, 291 (2008) (describing actions to end
school desegregation programs in the wake of Parents Involved); Sean F. Reardon &
John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Retreat from School
Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH
TURN BACK? 51 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005); Charles T.
Clotfelter et al., Do Southern Schools Face Rapid Resegregation?: Segregation and
Resegregation in North Carolina’s Public School Classrooms, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1463, 1463–
96 (2003).
9. Powell, supra note 6, at 671–80 (outlining a strong critique of school
choice models).
10. Hubert Humphrey, Jr. served two terms as a Minnesota Senator and
served as Vice President under Lyndon B. Johnson. Humphrey is remembered for
his support of and leadership in the Civil Rights Era. See generally TIMOTHY N.
THURBER, THE POLITICS OF EQUALITY: HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AND THE AFRICAN
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powerful and longstanding tradition of Republican support of civil
12
rights and known for its progressive education policies, chose its
voluntary integration rules over an alternative proposal that
mandated racial integration in all public schools and sanctioned
noncompliant schools and districts. The alternative proposal was
drafted by a select panel of school district representatives and civil
rights advocates and was endorsed by both the State Board of
13
Instead of implementing
Education and the state legislature.
rules that mandate racial integration, Minnesota opted for rules
that rely almost exclusively on parental choice and school districts’
voluntary efforts.
Attempting to predict changes to the Supreme Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, Minnesota thought the
Court would not find racially integrated schools to be a compelling
governmental interest and that the state could not, therefore,
14
mandate race-based integration. Yet, Minnesota’s approach is not
colorblind, as the rules require significant reporting of race-based
data. The rules do not require districts to avoid racial isolation
proactively or to remedy racial imbalance unless it is proven to be
15
caused by intentional discrimination. The rules instead rely on
the voluntary efforts of districts, schools, and parents for racial
16
integration of public schools. This is their fatal flaw.
After nearly ten years of Minnesota’s educational schoolchoice experiment, segregation in Minnesota schools has only
AMERICAN FREEDOM STRUGGLE (Columbia Univ. Press ed., 1998).
11. Roy Wilkins was a crusading leader in the civil rights movement. Julian
Bond, Introduction to STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS ix, x (Da
Capo Press ed., 1994). Among his many accomplishments, Wilkins also served as
Executive Director of the NAACP from 1964 to 1977. Id. Wilkins moved to St.
Paul as a child and later graduated from the University of Minnesota in 1923; he
worked in the Twin Cities thereafter. Id. at x–xi.
12. See Karen Evans Stout & Byron Stevens, The Case of the Failed Diversity Rule:
A Multiple Stream Analysis, 22 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 341, 342–43
(2000) (observing that “Minnesota has enjoyed a reputation for leadership in
education policy circles” and that it has a “progressive legacy”); Tim L. Mazzoni,
The Changing Politics of State Education Policy Making: A 20-Year Minnesota Perspective,
15 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 357, 361 (1993) (“Minnesota’s political
culture has often been lauded for its grassroots participation, governmental
effectiveness, and policy innovations.”).
13. See infra Part III.A–C.
14. See infra Part III.D.
15. See MINN. R. 3535.0150 (2007); MINN. R. 3535.0160 (2007). See also infra
Part II.B and accompanying notes.
16. See Minn. R. 3535.0160 (2007); MINN. R. 3535.0170 (2007). See also infra
Part II.B.
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intensified—its students of color have steadily become more
17
Minnesota is
isolated in high-poverty, low-performing schools.
moving away from providing a racially integrated education for all
of its students. Whether the rules themselves caused the increased
racial isolation or merely allowed it to happen, Minnesota’s
experience shows the danger of removing integration mandates.
Minnesota’s experience suggests that if educational equity for all
students is the goal, there must be a compelling interest in
proactively addressing racial isolation in schools and that states
must mandate, rather than just encourage, integration. Choicebased integration plans will only continue the national trend of
18
resegregation of our nation’s schools.
This article advocates that states address racial isolation rather
than wait for the inevitable. States must mandate consideration of
race in their educational policies so that public schools begin to
reflect the racial diversity of this nation and so all students can
benefit from education in a racially integrated setting.
Part I summarizes the United States Supreme Court’s most
recent school-integration case, clarifying that a majority of the
current Court still permits states to mandate change in the face of
19
racial isolation in their schools. Part I also highlights the benefits
20
of racially integrated schools. Part II outlines Minnesota’s current
choice-based integration rules and documents the increasing
21
segregation of students of color in Twin Cities schools. Part III
traces the history of Minnesota’s decision to adopt choice-based
integration, illustrating that the state’s decision has proved
ineffective for its schools and should not serve as the model for
22
other states. In particular, this section documents the dramatic
increase in racial isolation in Minnesota schools since the adoption
17. See infra Part II.C.
18. Today, while demographic trends mean that fewer white students attend
white-segregated schools, a growing number of blacks and Latino students attend
minority-segregated schools—a fact that is not accounted for by increasing racial
diversity. Despite this increasing diversity, the average white student attends a
school that is 77% white. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS,
ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES
21–30 (2007), http://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/deseg/reversals_
reseg_need.pdf. Conversely, the average black or Hispanic/Latino student attends
a school that is more than half black and Latino. Id.
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
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of choice-based integration rules.
Part IV employs two examples to explain how Minnesota’s
approach provides little support for school districts attempting to
integrate their schools affirmatively and leaves the state powerless
to do anything when school districts make attendance-area
decisions that will inevitably lead to, and cause, increased racial
23
isolation in schools. Part V concludes that Minnesota—and any
state where integration policies fail to affect change in the face of
increasing racial isolation—must modify its rules to mandate
districts to consider race when making attendance-area decisions
and to draw such lines in a manner that will maximize racial
24
integration in the schools.
I.

STATES HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST IN ADDRESSING RACIAL
ISOLATION IN K-12 EDUCATION

A. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Parents Involved
Any discussion of state efforts to integrate its schools racially
must acknowledge the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on
the issue in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
25
District No. 1. The case is particularly important in a discussion of
Minnesota’s choice-based integration rules because Minnesota’s
underlying rationale for implementing the rules was its prediction of
what the Supreme Court would say about states’ voluntary
26
integration plans.
In Parents Involved, the Court struck down Seattle’s and
Louisville’s race-based plans, which proactively integrated their
public schools, holding that the plans were not sufficiently tailored
27
to pass a strict-scrutiny analysis. Led by Chief Justice Roberts, four
other justices also proclaimed that states do not have a “compelling
28
interest” in addressing racial isolation in K-12 education. These
four justices, two of whom were not on the Court when Minnesota
adopted its current rules, would continue to limit race-conscious
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part V.
25. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
26. See infra Part III.D.
27. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760; id. at 2790–91 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
28. Id. at 2757–58 (Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito joined Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion); id. at 2768–69 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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policies in K-12 education to only those situations where they are
29
necessary to remedy intentional discrimination. Ironically, they
30
31
By
rely on Brown v. Board of Education to accomplish this.
limiting Brown to its particular facts, they conclude that only state32
mandated racial separation in schools is prohibited. According to
these four justices, racially isolated schools are legally equal as long
as they cannot be directly tied to intentional discrimination by the
33
34
state. States cannot remedy de facto racial isolation. To do so, in
the words of Justice Roberts (but again not joined by a majority of
the Court), would be to continue “discriminating on the basis of
35
race.”

29. See id. at 2752 (noting that “‘the Constitution is not violated by racial
imbalance in the schools, without more.’” (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 280 n.14 (1977))). Justice Thomas would further limit this remedial interest
to only those situations “in which a school district has a ‘history of maintaining two
sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a
governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.’” Id.
at 2771 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971)). Justice Thomas further stated, “[i]n most cases,
there either will or will not have been a state constitutional amendment, state
statute, local ordinance, or local administrative policy explicitly requiring
separation of the races.” Id. at 2771 n.4. In other words, Justice Thomas would
limit this interest to addressing only discrimination of the blatant type that existed
during the Jim Crow era.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. The plurality’s analysis has been criticized as an “astonishing attempt to
rewrite the history of desegregation and to use Brown as a justification for blocking
efforts to integrate schools.” James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary
Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 133 (2007). Justice Stevens, in his dissent, writes
that “[t]here is a cruel irony in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s reliance on our decision in
Brown v. Board of Education.” Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2797 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer states that the plurality “undermines Brown’s promise
of integrated primary and secondary education that local communities have
sought to make a reality.” Id. at 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2767–68; id. at 2769 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
33. Id. at 2767–68; id. at 2769 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 2767–68; id. at 2786 n.27 (Thomas, J., concurring).
35. Id. at 2768.
Roberts’s plurality opinion reflects the opinion of
Minnesota’s legal advisor at the time the current desegregation rules were
implemented. The Office of the Attorney General predicted that the Supreme
Court might rule in this manner and therefore recommended that the state adopt
rules that do not require school districts to remedy racial isolation proactively in
their schools unless it could be proven that such isolation was caused by intentional
discrimination. See infra Part III.D. The state’s legal analysis similarly limited
Brown to its facts, criticizing an expanded reading of the underlying significance of
that historic decision. See id. (discussing Minnesota’s legal analysis of Brown).
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The majority of today’s Court, however, rejects these parts of
the plurality opinion and explicitly recognizes that states have a
compelling interest to address racial isolation in their schools.
Justice Kennedy characterizes Justice Roberts’s “postulate that
‘[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
36
He
discriminating on the basis of race . . .’” as too simplistic.
explains:
Fifty years of experience since Brown . . . should teach us
that the problem before us defies so easy a solution.
School districts can seek to reach Brown’s objective of
equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at
least open to the interpretation that the Constitution
requires school districts to ignore the problem of de facto
resegregation in schooling.
I cannot endorse that
conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests
the Constitution mandates that state and local school
authorities must accept the status quo of racial isolation in
37
schools, it is, in my view, profoundly mistaken.
Justice Kennedy concludes this section of his opinion with a strong
statement in favor of states’ interest and right to address racial
isolation in their schools:
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that
ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A
compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an
interest that a school district, in its discretion and
38
expertise, may choose to pursue.
Justice Breyer—in his dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—identified Seattle’s and Louisville’s
interest as “greater racial integration of public schools” or the
“districts’ interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation
and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes
each of the district’s schools and each individual student’s public
39
Breyer agreed that such an interest is
school experience.”
compelling because it addresses consequences of prior conditions
40
of segregation, seeks to overcome “the adverse educational effects

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2801, 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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produced by and associated with highly segregated schools,” and
promotes “an educational environment that reflects the ‘pluralistic
42
society’ in which our children will live.” Breyer concludes, “[i]f
an educational interest that combines these three elements is not
43
‘compelling,’ what is?”
B. Demonstrated Benefits of Racially Integrated Schools
Social science research continues to support the state’s
compelling interest in pursuing racially integrated education.
Integrated schools give all students access to social networks that
44
Minority
are connected to opportunity and social mobility.
students who graduate from desegregated schools have higher
career aspirations than students who attend segregated schools and
tend to choose more lucrative occupations in which minorities are
45
Black male students that attend
historically underrepresented.
46
desegregated schools tend to complete more years of education
47
The demonstrated
and have higher college attendance rates.
benefits of integration for students of color include improved test
48
49
higher graduation rates,
higher post-graduation
scores,
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971)).
43. Id. at 2823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Mark Granovetter, The Micro-Structure of School Desegregation, in SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 99–107
(Jeffrey Prager, Douglas Longshore & Melvin Seeman eds., 1986).
45. ROBERT L. CRAIN & JACK STRAUSS, CTR. FOR SOC. ORG. OF SCH., SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION AND BLACK OCCUPATIONAL ATTAINMENTS: RESULTS FROM A LONGTERM EXPERIMENT 15, 27–28 (1985). See also Jomills H. Braddock & James M.
McPartland, How Minorities Continue To Be Excluded from Equal Employment
Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 5,
11 (1987) (concluding that “segregated [social] networks lead to poor-paying,
more segregated jobs . . . and desegregated [social] networks lead to better paying,
less segregated work.”).
46. CRAIN & STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 26–28.
47. Id.
48. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 175
(2006) (noting that segregation negatively affects SAT scores); Kathryn M.
Borman et al., Accountability in a Postdesegregation Era: The Continuing Significance of
Racial Segregation in Florida’s Schools, 41 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 605, 622 (2004); Roslyn
Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence
from the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1546 (2003) (noting that
“the more time both black and white students spend in desegregated elementary
schools, the higher their standardized test scores in middle and high school . . .
.”); Geoffrey D. Borman & N. Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multilevel
Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data 42 (April 2006)
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51

incomes, and better life opportunities.
With respect to white
52
students, integration does not negatively affect their performance,
53
54
improves critical thinking skills, reduces racial prejudice, and
55
prepares students for life in a multiracial society.
Racially segregated schools do not offer students equal
opportunity; instead they expose students to a culture of
intergenerational poverty and its attendant challenges. Non-white,
economically segregated schools “often transmit lower expectations
to minority students and offer a narrower range of educational and
56
job-related options.” Racially segregated, non-white schools are
57
almost always high-poverty schools. High-poverty schools typically
have less qualified and less experienced teachers, more limited, less
challenging curriculums, and produce lower educational
58
Perhaps most importantly, integrated schools
expectations.
decrease racial prejudice among students and facilitate positive,
59
Both this social science research and a
interracial relations.
majority of today’s Court thus acknowledge racial integration as a
compelling interest that states may proactively pursue.

(unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Educational Research Association) (on file with authors).
49. Michael A. Boozer et al., Race and School Quality Since Brown v. Board of
Education, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 269, 305
(Martin Neil Bailey & Clifford M. Winston eds., 1992).
50. Id.
51. Granovetter, supra note 44, at 81–110.
52. RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER NOW: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 228–257 (2001).
53. Anthony Lising Antonio et al., Effects of Racial Diversity on Complex Thinking
in College Students, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 509 (2004).
54. Thomas Pettigrew & Linda Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact
Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751, 766 (2006).
55. See Jomills H. Braddock II, Robert L. Crain & James M. McPartland, A
Long-Term View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, 66
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 262 (1984) (citing Richard Scott & James M. McPartland,
Desegregation as National Policy: Correlates of Racial Attitudes, 19 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 397–
414 (1982)) (noting that “desegregated schools improves the attitudes of both
blacks and whites toward future interracial situations.”).
56. Boozer et al., supra note 49, at 305.
57. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s
Nightmare?, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 21 (2004).
58. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Why Segregation Matters: Poverty and
Educational Inequality, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIVERSITY 16–30
(2005).
59. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 54, at 751–83.
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II. MINNESOTA’S CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION RULES
A. Minnesota’s Commitment to Racially Integrated Schools
Until the early 1990s, Minnesota explicitly recognized the
benefits of integration and sought to address racial integration
proactively in its schools. Its State Board of Education had a strong
record of advocating for policies that would eliminate racial
60
separation of students. As early as 1967, the Board unanimously
adopted a policy that recognized that “racial imbalance can be
educationally harmful to both white and nonwhite children as it
encourages prejudice and presents an inaccurate picture of life as
pupils prepare to live and work in a multi-racial community, nation,
61
62
Perhaps most significantly, a few years later, the
and world.”
Board adopted desegregation rules that sought to assist school
districts in identifying and eliminating racial segregation in its
63
The Board recognized the value of “integrated
schools.
education, sensitively conducted, in improving academic
achievement of disadvantaged children, and in increasing mutual
64
understanding among students from all backgrounds.”
Minnesota’s former desegregation rules required each
school board to report the racial composition of its schools to the
Commissioner of Education and to the extent any school’s minority
population exceeded that of the district by 15%, to submit and
implement a “comprehensive plan for the elimination of such
65
segregation.” The penalty for any district’s failure to comply with
66
In any mandated
the rules was reduction of state aid.
60. EEO SECTION OF MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., DESEGREGATION POLICY ANALYSIS
29–31 (1988).
61. Id. at App. A (attaching MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICY ON RACIAL
IMBALANCE AND DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1967)).
62. During this same time in Minnesota history, the federal court began
oversight of desegregation efforts in the Minneapolis School District as a result of
class action litigation brought by the NAACP. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No.
1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972). See also Cheryl W. Heilman, Booker v. Special
School District No. 1: A History of School Desegregation in Minneapolis, Minnesota, 12
LAW & INEQ. 127 (1993) (detailing the history of this desegregation case under
which the court exercised jurisdiction for over ten years, from 1972 until 1983).
63. MINN. R. 3535.0300 (1973) (amended 1999).
64. Id. (quoting U.S. Senate Rep. of the Select Comm., 92nd Cong., on Equal
Educational Opportunities). In 1978, these rules were amended to specify that
segregation occurred when the minority population in any school building
exceeded that of the district by 15%. MINN. R. 3535.0200, subp. 4 (1978).
65. MINN. R. 3535.0400 (1973) (amended 1999).
66. Id. The rule authorized the Commissioner to approve a variance from
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desegregation plan, school boards were to use methods that were
“educationally sound and administratively and economically
feasible,” which could include “voluntary metropolitan or inter67
The rules also explicitly required
district cooperative plans.”
boards to consider the racial impact of new school construction or
addition to existing buildings and prohibited the Commissioner
from approving any plans that would “perpetuate or increase racial
68
segregation.”
B. Minnesota’s Current Rules
Minnesota’s current rules state their commitment to racially
69
integrated education but effectively end any affirmative obligation
to prevent racial isolation in Minnesota’s schools. They instead
adopt a model that relies heavily on school choice.
Contemporaneous media described the new rules as “end[ing]
mandatory integration in Minnesota as long as districts could prove
students had a choice of schools to attend beyond their
70
The rules proclaim that “the primary goal of
neighborhood.”
public education is to enable all students to have opportunities to
71
achieve academic success” and highlight that providing parents a
choice in where their children attend school is “an important
72
The rules only
component of Minnesota’s education policy.”
“encourage” districts to provide opportunities for students to attend
73
racially balanced schools and “encourage adjoining districts to work
74
The rules
cooperatively to improve cross-district integration.”
acknowledge that many factors impact the ability of school districts
to provide racially balanced schools, such as housing, jobs, and
the 15% standard, which could allow school buildings to exceed “50% minority
enrollment” if school boards could “justify an educational reason” for the
variance. Id. In determining whether the district’s rationale justified the variance,
the State Board was to consider “whether other alternatives [were] educationally
and economically available to the district such that the variance [was] not
needed.” MINN. R. 3535.0700 (1973) (amended 1999).
67. MINN. R. 3535.1000 (1973) (amended 1999).
68. MINN. R. 3535.1100 (1973) (amended 1999).
69. MINN. R. 3535.0100(B) (2007).
70. Paul Tosto, State Leaders Drafting New Plan for Desegregation in Schools, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 28, 1998, at A1.
71. MINN. R. 3535.0100(A) (2007).
72. Id. at .0100(D). Cross-district efforts to improve integration are also
supposed to provide parents and students “meaningful choices.” Id. at .0100(H).
73. Id. at .0100(G) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at .0100(H) (emphasis added).
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transportation, but do not mandate the state do anything to
75
address these other factors.
In terms of proactively seeking to integrate public schools
racially, the rules require very little of Minnesota school districts.
The rules mandate a reporting mechanism for information about
76
A district’s report that
the racial composition of all schools.
indicates a “racially identifiable school”—defined as having an
“enrollment of protected students” that is “more than 20
percentage points above the enrollment of protected students in
77
the entire district” —triggers an investigation by the
Commissioner as to whether such racially identifiable schools were
78
“motivated at least in part by a discriminatory purpose.” In the
course of this investigation, the district must submit additional
79
But it is only after a full
information to the Commissioner.
investigation and a finding by the Commissioner that a school
80
district has engaged in intentional segregation that the rules
81
require the district to address the racial isolation in any school.
The rules thus set a high threshold for mandating any effort to
address racial concentration. In fact, notwithstanding the growing
racial segregation in Minnesota schools, the Commissioner of
Education has not found any district to have intentionally
82
segregated its students under these current rules.
The rules rely almost exclusively on voluntary mechanisms for
addressing racial isolation. The rules require districts with “racially
identifiable schools” to develop plans that “provide options to help
75. Id. at .0100(C). The rules also explicitly exempt certain public schools
from the integration efforts, including charter schools, area learning centers,
alternative programs, and treatment facilities. MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 8 (2007).
76. MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007).
77. MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 6 (2007).
78. MINN. R. 3535.0130 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Id., subp. 1.
81. After a finding of intentional segregation, the school district must
implement a plan to remedy such discrimination; failure to cooperate with the
Commissioner in developing or implementing such a plan may result in reduction
of state aid and other appropriate sanctions. MINN. R. 3535.0150 (2007).
82. As of November 2005, Minnesota’s Office of the Legislative Auditor
reported that the Minnesota Department of Education (“MDE”) had conducted
only three in-depth reviews of school districts to determine whether intentional
segregation exists, and that there were twelve districts at that time with racially
identifiable schools that MDE should review. OFFICE OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, STATE
OF MINN., EVALUATION REPORT: SCHOOL DISTRICT INTEGRATION REVENUE 12 (2005),
http://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/integrevf.pdf
[hereinafter
INTEGRATION REVENUE].
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integrate” the schools and to establish and work with community
83
The goal of such plans is
collaboration councils in doing so.
“increased opportunities for interracial contact between
84
students.” The rules require the Commissioner to evaluate such
plans annually and report findings and recommendations to the
85
legislature. The rules require racially isolated school districts to
create multidistrict collaboration councils with adjoining districts to
86
develop an integration plan. By statute, Minnesota also provides
integration revenue to all districts that have a racially isolated
87
Yet,
school or that are themselves a racially isolated district.
nowhere in the rules is the key term, “integration,” defined, and
the rules define “racial balance” as “increased interaction of
protected students and white students within schools and between
districts,” without providing any specific criteria or measurable
88
goal.
C. Under the Rules, Minnesota Schools Resegregate
Today, children of color in the Twin Cities are far more likely
to attend a racially isolated school than they were ten years ago.
The number of racially isolated schools in the Minneapolis/St. Paul
metropolitan area has more than doubled since 2000, from twenty89
two to fifty. Today, students of color are more likely to attend a
90
segregated school than they were in 1990. And these segregated,
83. MINN. R. 3535.0160 (2007). The rules specifically exempt from this
requirement any school that is racially identifiable because of a concentration of
enrolled American Indian students that exists either because of special programs
for such students or voluntary choices by such students or their parents. Id., subp.
1(B).
84. Id., subp. 3(A).
85. Id., subp. 4.
86. MINN. R. 3535.0170 (2007).
87. MINN. STAT. § 124D.86 (2007). In addition to the failure of the rules
themselves to effect positive change in Minnesota schools, the state’s provision of
integration funding may, in fact, provide disincentives for districts to remedy racial
imbalance because, except for three designated cities (Minneapolis, St. Paul, and
Duluth), the additional funding depends on a finding of racial isolation in either a
school or the district itself. See INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 32.
88. MINN. R. 3535.0110, subp. 5 (2007).
89. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, RACIALLY IDENTIFIABLE SCHOOLS
WITHIN A DISTRICT FOR 06–07 (2007); INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 24.
90. Myron Orfield, Baris Gumus-Dawes, Thomas Luce & Geneva Finn,
Neighborhood and School Segregation in the Twin Cities Region, in REGION: LAW, POLICY,
AND THE FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES (Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce eds.)
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 24, on file with authors). The Institute on
Race and Poverty defines non-white segregated schools as schools where the share
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91

minority-dominated schools are poor schools. In the Twin Cities,
the poverty rate at minority-segregated schools is two and a half
times greater than the poverty rate of integrated schools and eight
and a half times higher than the poverty rate at predominantly
92
white schools.
In 1992, before the state implemented its current rules, Twin
Cities schools appeared to be integrating; a small core of schools in
the central cities was segregated, but the inner-ring suburban
93
By 2002, however, these
schools were rapidly integrating.
94
integrated schools had become segregated. Families of color that
moved to the suburbs to escape segregated, high-poverty, inner-city
schools were now caught in segregated, high-poverty suburban
95
schools. The resegregation of Twin Cities schools was the result
of unstable integration, a situation where integration was only a
96
stopping point on the path to segregation.
If Minnesota had implemented the metro-wide plan proposed
in 1995, it most likely would not have experienced this extreme
of black, Hispanic, or Asian students exceeds 50%, or in schools with varying
combinations of black, Hispanic, and Asian students, where the relative share of
white students in the schools does not exceed 30%. Id. In predominantly white
schools, the share of each non-white group is smaller than 10%. Id. at 23. Any
school that is neither non-white segregated nor predominantly white is considered
integrated. Id. In other cities, researchers have shown that this increasing racial
isolation of students of color is not merely attributable to rising numbers of
students of color but rather to school district policies in the wake of the
termination of court oversight. Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Federal Oversight, Local
Control, and the Specter of “Resegregation” in Southern Schools, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
347 (2006).
91. Orfield et al., supra note 90.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 26–30.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The process of unstable school integration and resegregation occurred as
follows: Schools start to resegregate at about the same time that they begin to look
integrated, when the school has a student-of-color population of around 31–36%.
Id. at 20. When the student-of-color population reaches this threshold, white
parents, steered away by realtor or personal perceptions that integrated schools
are inferior, stop moving to the school’s attendance zone. Id. at 25–27.
Conversely, families of color are steered into integrated schools and
neighborhoods. Id. at 26. This process leads to neighborhood segregation, which
usually trails school segregation. Id. at 25–27. While resegregating schools are not
usually high-poverty schools, once the schools are segregated, the schools become
high-poverty as the parents with the means to leave the school do so. Id. at 25.
Once schools become identifiably segregated, high-poverty schools, reintegration
is extremely difficult, as parents are reluctant to send their children to segregated
high-poverty schools when alternatives exist. Id. at 26.
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resegregation. Other states that implemented metro-wide school
desegregation plans did not experience neighborhood or school
97
For
resegregation to the same degree as the Twin Cities.
example, when the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district, a metrowide district in North Carolina, had a court-ordered desegregation
plan, neighborhoods across the county remained relatively
98
When the school district ended its court-ordered
integrated.
desegregation plan and moved to a neighborhood school model,
99
The logic behind metroneighborhoods rapidly resegregated.
wide, mandatory plans is that families cannot easily avoid attending
integrated schools by purchasing homes in white-segregated
neighborhoods. No matter where families find housing, students
will attend integrated schools.
Minnesota’s rules, however,
encourage piecemeal, voluntary integration plans, which have
allowed realtors and families to steer clear of integrated schools.
The result has been rapid school segregation in inner-ring suburbs,
greater racial and economic segregation for children of color, and
reduced life opportunities for a large part of the Twin Cities
100
population.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MINNESOTA’S CHOICE-BASED RULES
Until 1995, it appeared that Minnesota would continue its
commitment to mandatory desegregation and adopt rules that
would both mandate metro-wide desegregation and penalize
noncompliant districts. A brief history of the current rules reveals
that at this pivotal point in time, Minnesota chose a different path.
In the face of great political opposition to the proposed rules,
Minnesota instead opted for rules that were heavy in reporting
mechanisms and light on any real mandates or effective remedies.
And it did so claiming that the law required such an approach. In
hindsight, these rules were neither legally required nor effective in
preventing racially isolated schools.

97. Id. at 12.
98. Brief for Swann Fellowship as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
99. JEFFREY M. WEINSTEIN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCHOOL
CHARACTERISTICS AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS: EVIDENCE FROM SCHOOL
REDISTRICTING 23 (Job Market Paper, Nov. 11, 2007), available at
http://econweb.tamu.edu/Job%20Candidates/2008/Papers/Weinstein.pdf.
100. Orfield et al., supra note 90, at 7–11.
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A. Minnesota Seeks to Address Growing Racial Isolation in Its Schools
In 1988, the Minnesota Department of Education concluded
that although the original rules were effectively desegregating the
schools, its numerical definition of segregation was becoming
unworkable, particularly in districts such as Minneapolis and St.
101
Paul where the minority population had increased significantly.
In addition, by the 1990s, families of color were moving from the
central cities to the suburbs and suburban schools were beginning
102
State officials feared that this integration would be
to integrate.
unstable and lead to minority-segregated schools in the same way
103
In light
city schools had segregated ten and twenty years earlier.
of these phenomena, the Department recommended that the State
Board of Education provide leadership in promoting racial
104
integration across the state.
For over two years, the Board actively pursued this work,
holding public meetings on the need for new desegregation rules
105
In May 1991, the State Board
and completing several drafts.
recommended, among other things, that metro-wide desegregation
be pursued by declaring the seven-county metropolitan area a
special government area for school integration purposes and that
101. Specifically, in Minneapolis, the minority-student population grew from
24.4% in 1978, when the rule was adopted, to 50% in 1989. STATE OF MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN, FAMILIES, & LEARNING, STATEMENT OF NEED AND
REASONABLENESS IN THE MATTER OF THE PROPOSED RULES RELATING TO
DESEGREGATION: MINNESOTA RULES CHAPTER 3535 (3535.0100 TO 3535.0180) 8–9
(Nov. 1998) [hereinafter SONAR]. Similarly, the St. Paul School District’s
minority enrollment increased from 22% to 42% in the same time period. Id. As
of 1997, the state argued that to qualify as a “segregated” school under the old
rules, a school in Minneapolis would have had to be over 82% protected students.
Id. And, with the 30% variance, it could have had more than 97% students of
color and still be in compliance. Id. at 9.
102. See generally STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION DESEGREGATION/INTEGRATION
RECOMMENDATIONS (May 14, 1991) [hereinafter INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATIONS].
103. Id. See also Memorandum from Donald Hadfield, Educ. Specialist, Equal
Educ. Opportunities to Robert Wedl, Deputy Comm’r, Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (Oct.
14, 1988) (on file with authors) (expressing school districts’ fears that existing
rules would not lead to stably integrated schools).
104. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY SECTION OF MINN. DEPT. OF EDUC., DESEGREGATION
POLICY ANALYSIS 39–41, 49 (Jan. 19, 1988). The Department’s report emphasized
the societal benefits of racially integrated education for all students in preparing
them “as citizens to live and function productively in a pluralistic society.” Id. at
7–8. And it acknowledged the state’s obligation to remedy not only subjectively
intentional separation of students by race, but also such segregation that was a
“natural and foreseeable consequence” of state policy. Id. at 15.
105. SONAR, supra note 101, at 8–9.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 2

2009]

CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION IN EDUCATION

953

the Governor should convene a task force to address segregation at
the state level in the areas of planning, housing, education,
106
In 1992, the State Board drafted
transportation, and civil rights.
new rules that, notably, defined desegregation and segregation as
“intentional or unintentional” racial separation of students or staff
within schools and districts and required all schools within the
seven-county metropolitan area to consult with Minneapolis and St.
107
Paul in developing their integration plans.
B. Roundtable Discussion Group Began Working on Mandatory
Desegregation Rules
In 1993, the legislature became involved in the desegregation
rulemaking efforts. Responding to the State Board’s work, the
legislature specifically directed the Board to convene meetings to
108
In mid-1993, the Board
address the proposed rule changes.
quickly assembled what became known as the “Roundtable
Discussion Group,” whose membership list reflected the broad109
based participation that the legislature mandated.
In February 1994, the Roundtable Discussion Group submitted
a final report to the State Board, which proposed new
110
desegregation rules that reaffirmed Brown’s holding “that racially
111
and stated,
segregated schools are inherently unequal”
“segregation in schools prevents equal educational opportunity and

106. INTEGRATION RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 102, at 5.
107. MINN. R. 3535.0300, subps. 3, 6 (Feb. 2, 1992 Draft) (amended 1999)
(emphasis added).
108. 1993 Minn. Laws 1174.
109. The report includes a list of roughly fifty individuals, representing
organizations including the NAACP, the PTA, St. Paul and Minneapolis School
Districts, the School Boards Association, the Urban League, the Urban Coalition,
and the Asian-Pacific Coalition, who participated in the discussions. ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSION GROUP ON DESEGREGATION/INTEGRATION AND INCLUSIVE EDUCATION
FINAL REPORT TO: STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND STATE LEGISLATURE, i and App. A
(Feb. 1994) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994)].
110. The work of the Roundtable Discussion Group included both proposed
rules relating to desegregation, or the student population at specific school sites,
and what later became known as the “education diversity rule,” rules relating to
closing the achievement gap between students of color and white students. After
1995, the State Board separated the diversity rule from the desegregation rule and
ultimately abandoned it altogether. This article is concerned primarily with the
history and application of the desegregation rules. For more information about
the diversity rule and its demise, see Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 341.
111. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
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112

leads to segregation in the broader society.” The rules called for
113
intra-governmental responsibility in promoting desegregation,
114
metro-wide school integration, measurable and results-oriented
115
116
desegregation plans, and strong penalties for noncompliance.
Describing the Roundtable’s report, the then-President of the
Board stated:
These proposals present the state policymakers, including
the state board, commissioner, governor and legislature,
an opportunity to provide strong and creative leadership
in addressing one of the critical issues of this decade. . . .
112. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109, at ii–iii (reaffirming
the decision in Brown v. Board of Education as a basic tenet and driving force
behind the Roundtable recommendations); ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0200
(Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
113. The rules, recognizing that school districts alone cannot effect
desegregation, looked to other governmental authorities for assistance in creating
housing, employment, and transportation policies that support school
desegregation. ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0200 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to
the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
114. The draft rules defined the “metropolitan area” to include school districts
from seven counties and used the percentage of learners of color in this metrowide area as the comparison to determine whether a particular district within the
metro area was segregated. ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0300, subps. 5, 11
(Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
The rules, which defined “segregation” as “intentional or unintentional separation
of learners of color or staff of color within a building or school district,”
considered segregated those school districts that have 15% or more learners of
color than the metro-wide percentage. Id., subp. 11(A) & (B). The rules also
defined segregation in the context of particular schools within a district, but based
those on comparisons between the schools and their district-wide average. Id.,
subp. 11(C). The rules also considered segregated to be those districts that have
fewer than 10% learners of color or less than half of the percentage of metro-wide
learners of color, whichever was larger. Id.
115. The draft rules included specific desegregation goals and strategies, both
inter- and intra-district, and practices relating to staffing, as well as building and
remodeling programs. ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0400, subp. 2 (Jan. 10,
1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
116. Districts that did not comply with the rules were given limited time and
assistance to do so, after which time the district would lose state aid.
ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT RULE 3535.0900 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE
DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109. The rules also gave the Commissioner
authority to order schools to be reconstituted that fail to meet their educational
goals within three years. Id. Prospectively, the rules mandated local school boards
to consider and “give maximum effect to” preventing and eliminating both racial
and socioeconomic segregation in schools, and stated that the Commissioner
would not approve plans for additions to schools or new construction “when such
approval will perpetuate or increase racial segregation.” ROUNDTABLE’S DRAFT
RULE 3535.1000 (Jan. 10, 1994) App. D to the ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb.
1994), supra note 109.
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Now is the time for state policymakers to provide strong
and proactive leadership. The window of opportunity is
closing quickly—if nothing is done, we face a very serious
threat of major litigation, which may result in costly and
117
prescriptive solutions ordered by the courts.
The legislature endorsed the Roundtable’s rules by giving the
118
Board authority to implement them.
C. State Rules Take a Sharp Turn
In 1995, the direction of Minnesota’s desegregation rules
changed dramatically. Early opposition to the Board’s work came
from the Department of Education. For example, in December
1994, the then-Assistant Commissioner advocated for a voluntary
approach to inter-district integration that would use incentives
119
In January 1995, the Department
rather than mandates.
recommended that the new desegregation rules should focus on
improving learning for all students and provide racial balance
120
It further recommended
through voluntary parent choice.
eliminating both the penalty of reconstituting noncompliant
schools and the requirement that the Commissioner consider
desegregation when approving new school sites, arguing that
121
neither was legally permissible.
117. Memorandum from John Plocker, President, Minn. State Bd. of Educ. to
Sen. Larry Pogemiller, Chair, Senate Educ. Comm., Rep. Lyndon Carlson Chair,
House Educ. Comm. and Rep. Kathleen Vallenga, Chair, House Educ. Fin. Div.
(Feb. 17, 1994) (on file with authors).
118. 1994 Minn. Laws 2628–29, ch. 647, art. 8, § 1. At the same time, the
legislature established an Office of Desegregation/Integration in the Department
of Education and mandated the Commissioner to coordinate the office activities
and create an advisory board of eight superintendents and a representative from
each of the same four councils specified in the creation of the Roundtable
Discussion Group. Id. § 2, subdivs. 1–3.
119. Memorandum
from
Robert
J.
Wedl,
Assistant
Comm’r,
Desegregation/Integration in Minn. to Members of the Roundtable Discussion
Group, at ¶ 2–3 (Dec. 15, 1994).
120. Memorandum from Robert J. Wedl, Assistant Comm’r, Proposed
Desegregation/Integration Learning Policy to Members of the State Bd. of Educ.
(Jan. 10, 1995).
121. Memorandum
from
Robert
J.
Wedl,
Assistant
Comm’r,
Desegregation/Integration in Minn. to Members of the Roundtable Discussion
Group (Dec. 15, 1994). In February 1995, the State Board adopted a preliminary
draft of the rules still based largely on the work of the Roundtable Discussion
Group and presented them to the House Education Committee. REVISED
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION GROUP 3 (Feb. 13, 1995).
The local newspaper described the Board’s action as taking “another step down
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In March of 1995, the Center of the American Experiment
published a 115-page monograph by Katherine Kersten that
challenged the benefit of racial balance in schools and highlighted
123
Kersten argued both that
the costs associated with such plans.
the State was not legally obligated to enact the proposed proactive
desegregation rules, and that in doing so, the State would expose
itself to greater liability in any future litigation because the rules
would impose higher legal standards than courts were imposing in
124
desegregation litigation.
The House Republican Task Force on Student Achievement
and Integration also formally responded to the proposed rules,
125
The task force questioned
raising some of the same concerns.
the road to equality.” Paul Drew Duchesne, State Board of Education’s Latest
Desegregation Plan Is on the Table, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 24 1995, at 2B.
Notably, this version of the rules included in the policy section that the State and
local boards would seek ways to collaborate with other authorities dealing with
housing, jobs, planning, and transportation. REVISED RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION GROUP 3 (Feb. 13, 1995).
122. At the time, the Center of the American Experiment was a relatively new
presence in Minnesota. Center of the American Experiment, About Us,
http://www.americanexperiment.org/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (citing
1990 as the date of the Center’s inception). With support from the corporate
community and several moderate Democrats, the Center was part of a network of
conservative institutions associated with the Heritage Foundation. Id.
123. KATHERINE A. KERSTEN, CENTER OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT, GOOD
INTENTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH: THE PERIL IMPOSED BY MINNESOTA’S NEW
DESEGREGATION PLAN (1995) [hereinafter KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS].
124. Id. at 3. Before Minnesota implemented its new rules, the Minneapolis
NAACP initiated litigation on behalf of children enrolled in the Minneapolis
public schools. Complaint, NAACP v. State, No. 95-14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995).
In state court, plaintiffs alleged that the State had not taken effective action to
desegregate the schools and that it reinforced racial and economic inequality
through its school-construction policies. Id. The lawsuit contended that the
resulting segregated education violated the Minnesota State Constitution’s
education and equal protection clauses. Id. The litigation was, in large part,
modeled after the ongoing litigation in Connecticut, Sheff v. O’Neil, which similarly
alleged a violation of the state’s constitution in providing inadequate education to
low-income, minority students. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). For further
discussion of Sheff and its relevance to Minnesota’s rules, see infra notes 150–53
and accompanying text.
125. HOUSE REPUBLICAN REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT
& INTEGRATION, BRIDGING GAPS & BREAKING BARRIERS: A MINNESOTA MODEL FOR
STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT & INTEGRATION (Nov. 1995) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT]. Both the Task Force Report and the Kersten monograph rely heavily on
the work of David Armor in his 1995 book, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the
Law, in questioning the educational benefits of school desegregation. Kersten
specifically noted that in June 1994, David Armor spoke in the Twin Cities with
legislators, school superintendents, and members of the State Board of Education.
KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 123, at 8.
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the Roundtable’s objectivity, arguing that it failed to consider the
negative consequences of mandatory school integration plans and
126
The task force
questioning its selection of national consultants.
also strongly opposed the use of any penalties against
nonconforming schools and called the reconstitution penalty a
127
“draconian measure that has never worked.”
The public controversy over the rules coincided with the
reelection of the Republican Governor, who appeared influenced
128
by the strong opposition to the rules coming from his party.
During the last half of the Governor’s second term, the controversy
surrounding the Board’s policy initiatives grew even stronger. This
time, the public response was to a related, but then distinct, set of
proposed rules known as the “diversity rules.” Again, Kersten
attacked the Board’s work, this time in her biweekly newspaper
129
She called for a public response, which came quickly
column.

126. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 125, at 5. In particular, the task force was
concerned that the Minneapolis school system had retained Hogan & Hartson
(former law firm of roundtable consultant David Tatel) to advise it on the merits
of filing a lawsuit against the state. Id. at 2. The task force recommended that the
State Board suspend the rulemaking process until it “obtains a great deal more
information from a broader array of experts” and that it consider the impact that
any changes to the present rule will have in providing a basis for or even
expanding state liability in lawsuits like the one brought by the Minneapolis
NAACP. Id. at 5–6. The task force criticized the use of mandatory inter-district
efforts as “a remedy more sweeping than one that could ever be imposed by a
federal court” and argued that the rules should not use racial percentages or
enrollment quotas. Id. at 6. The task force opposed the use of integration
councils as usurping the role of local school boards and the collection and
reporting of racial and ethnic data as “repugnant.” Id. at 7–8.
127. Id. at 8. Ironically, these are the very measures employed by the federal
No Child Left Behind Act for high-poverty schools receiving Title I funding that
do not achieve adequate yearly progress. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107–110, § 1116, 115 Stat. 1425, 1479–87 (2002).
128. Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 349–50.
129. Kersten characterized the rules as the State Board of Education’s “brave
new multicultural world,” that requires schools to teach “‘communication skills to
enable cross-cultural and inter-ethnic group interaction’ of the kind that works so
well in Beirut.” Katherine Kersten, State School Board’s Dubious Diversity Rules: Unless
Citizens Object Soon, There Won’t Be a Public Hearing, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Oct.
15, 1997, at 17A [hereinafter Kersten, Dubious Diversity]. Kersten claimed that the
rules would do little to assist Minnesota’s poor, minority students and would
instead put “numbers-juggling ahead of kids’ needs.” Id. She said that the rules
would actually hamper academic progress and that the “sprawling, politicized
curriculum” would “leave little time” for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Id. For
a discussion of Kersten’s article and its impact on the rules and the State Board,
see Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 346.
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130

and forcefully.
The article “sparked a maelstrom of bluster on
talk radio, and hundreds of calls and letters concerning the
proposed rule—including two death threats—poured into the
131
The thendepartment of Children, Families, and Learning.”
Board President drafted a response to Kersten’s article, but was
132
After initial public
instructed by the Governor not to release it.
hearings on the rule, the Governor asked the Board to stop
implementation because “the proposed rule [was] not in the best
133
Although the Board initially
interest of Minnesota children.”
voted against withdrawing the rules, two members’ terms then
expired. The Governor chose to appoint two new members, which
shifted the balance of power, and the Board withdrew the diversity
134
Shortly thereafter, the Minnesota legislature abolished its
rules.
135
State Board of Education, joining Wisconsin as the only state
136
without such a policy-setting entity.
D. State Attorney General Advises No Compelling Interest in K-12
Diversity
With this political backdrop and during the ongoing
controversy over the diversity rules, the desegregation rules
transformed dramatically under the direction of the Office of the
137
State Attorney General from 1995 until they were passed in 1999.
The Assistant Attorney General’s legal advice influenced the
130. See Kersten, Dubious Diversity, supra note 129.
131. Stout & Stevens, supra note 12, at 346.
132. Id. At the time of the controversy surrounding the diversity rules, the
Governor-appointed Board President simultaneously served as the Commissioner
of Human Rights, a position she held “at the pleasure of the Governor.” Id. at
349. The Board President followed the Governor’s directions and did not publicly
respond to Kersten’s attack of the Board’s work. Id.
133. Id. at 346.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 341, 347.
136. Minnesota and Wisconsin continue to be the only two states without a
board of education. Michele McNeil, Authority Gradually Eroding Stature of State
Boards, EDUC. WK., Mar. 18, 2008. In 2003, New Mexico essentially followed
Minnesota’s example by stripping its board of authority and making it advisoryonly. Id. Nationwide, there has been a recent trend of eroding school boards’
power “as lawmakers and governors seek to expand their authority over K-12
education and, in some cases, reverse education policy set in motion by elected or
appointed boards.” Id.
137. See SONAR, supra note 101, at 4. Although the Board had been working
on drafts of these rules for many years, it was not until it formally began the
rulemaking process that it consulted with the attorney general’s office. See id.
(discussing the review of the rules by the attorney general’s office).
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direction of the new desegregation rules in at least two significant
ways: 1) limiting the definition of “segregation” to include only
racial imbalance caused by intentional discrimination, and 2)
relying heavily on voluntary integration efforts by districts, schools,
and parents. Both of these changes were premised on the Attorney
General’s legal opinion that state action affirmatively requiring
racial balance in schools without a showing of intentional
138
discrimination would not survive an equal protection challenge.
The Statement of Need and Reasonableness (“SONAR”), the legal
argument drafted in support of the new rules for the administrative
hearings, concluded that diversity in K-12 education would not be
139
considered a compelling interest under a strict-scrutiny analysis.
Based on the state’s analysis, the new rules limit the definition
of segregation to only racial separation caused by a discriminatory
140
The state’s legal analysis rejected the Roundtable
purpose.
Draft’s invocation of Brown and its legacy as an underlying rationale
141
Brown’s holding was then limited to its facts:
for the new rules.
the state only has an affirmative duty to correct “governmentimposed, intentional segregation of students based on their race,”
142
The state argued that because it was an
not racial imbalance.
open question whether racial diversity in K-12 schools constituted a
“compelling interest,” any affirmative, race-conscious policy in this
143
For its
context would likely not withstand strict-scrutiny.
conclusion that the state should not mandate districts or schools to
consider race proactively, the state could not rely on any Eighth
Circuit or United States Supreme Court decision because the issue
138. See id. at 12–18.
139. Id. at 5–8, 12–21. Ironically, the legal challenge the state was facing at the
time did not challenge the constitutionality of the state’s affirmative policies,
which had been in place since the late 1970s, but rather the state’s failure to
adequately address racial segregation under the state constitution. See Complaint,
NAACP v. State, No. 95-14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 1995). Nonetheless, the state
seemed most concerned about an equal protection challenge brought by parents
or students alleging “reverse discrimination.” SONAR, supra note 101, at 19 (“The
concern with using racial quotas is not only that lawsuits will be brought, but more
importantly that it is highly doubtful that such suits can be won.”).
140. The state interpreted the case law as “call[ing] into serious question
whether it is permissible to have a rule which requires or even encourages racebased student assignments . . . absent a finding of intentional discrimination.”
SONAR, supra note 101, at 14.
141. Id. at B1 (“Brown v. Board of Education did not stand for the proposition
that racially segregated schools, without more, are inherently unequal.”).
142. Id. at 13.
143. Id. at 13–18.
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had not been decided. It was not until Parents Involved that the
144
Supreme Court addressed this issue. Thus, attempting to predict
what the Supreme Court would decide regarding whether states
have a compelling interest in addressing racial isolation in K-12
education, Minnesota summarized the Supreme Court’s decision in
145
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke on diversity in higher
education and its decisions on affirmative-action policies in other
146
It also highlighted opinions from several
government contexts.
circuit courts that it characterized as “severely limiting the use of
147
race-based measures in several different contexts” and cited to
several other then-recent decisions that held that the use of racial
quotas to maintain racial balance in the K-12 setting, absent a
148
remedial obligation, “will not likely be constitutional.”
In its constitutional analysis, the state did not effectively
incorporate the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent holding that
education is a fundamental right under the Minnesota
149
This holding should significantly alter the equal
Constitution.
protection analysis under the state constitution. A then-recent and
prominent decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Sheff v.
O’Neill, illustrates this analysis under a state constitutional
fundamental right to education similar to Minnesota’s fundamental
150
right to education. In Sheff, the court relied on the fundamental
right to education under its state constitution to conclude that it
had an affirmative obligation to address the racial and ethnic
isolation in the Hartford public schools even when an intentional
144. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007).
145. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
146. SONAR, supra note 101, at 14 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978)). The SONAR also cites to several affirmative action cases in
the employment context. Id. at 14–15 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476
U.S. 267, 283–84 (1986); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469
(1989)).
147. Id. at 15–16 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996);
Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994); Coal. for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997); People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ.,
111 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 1997); Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547
(3d Cir. 1996)).
148. Id. at 18–20 (citing Equal Open Enrollment Ass’n v. Akron Bd. of Educ.,
937 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir.
1998); and other contemporaneous litigation and settlements relating to this
issue)).
149. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (“Thus . . . we hold
that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution . . . .”).
150. 678 A.2d 1267, 1282 (Conn. 1996).
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151

state action did not cause such isolation.
The Sheff decision was
152
not without its critics, but Minnesota’s failure to address this
analysis seems problematic, especially at a time when there was
153
ongoing litigation against the state that had Sheff-like allegations.
Even assuming the state’s conclusion that it could not
proactively address racial isolation without a finding of intentional
discrimination was correct, the standard it set for doing so was so
high that it effectively prevented the Department of Education
154
Before any mandated
from making this determination.
integration, the Commissioner must find that racial imbalance in
the schools “results from acts motivated at least in part by a
155
Three of the five factors the
discriminatory purpose.”
Commissioner must consider during this inquiry require a showing
156
The rule mandates that the two
of “discriminatory purpose.”
other factors, which consider the impact of official decisions rather
than their underlying motives, cannot alone support a finding of
151. Id. The court also proclaimed that, consistent with public policy, the
state’s constitutional responsibility “encompasses responsibility for segregation to
which the legislature has contributed, even unintentionally.” Id. at 1285.
152. In fact, one of the experts Minnesota relied upon in the administrative
hearings on the proposed desegregation rules, Christine Rossell, soundly criticized
the Connecticut Supreme Court’s holding. Christine H. Rossell, An Analysis of the
Court Decisions in Sheff v. O’Neill and Possible Remedies for Racial Isolation, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 1187, 1200 (1997) (arguing that “any individual or state agency could
bring suit in federal district court and have the Connecticut Supreme Court’s
finding reversed . . . . [This is because] a race based remedy would not be allowed
in a situation where there has been no intentional racial violation.”).
153. See Xiong v. State, 195 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 1999); NAACP v. Metro.
Council, 125 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), aff’d on
reh’g, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 826 (1998).
154. The SONAR even predicted that “the finding of intentional segregation
would be very rare, since in the past 25 years, no such findings have been made by
the Commissioner.” SONAR, supra note 101, at A13.
155. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007).
156. The first three factors are:
A. the historical background of the acts which led to the racial
composition of the school, including whether the acts reveal a series of
official actions taken for discriminatory purposes;
B. whether the specific sequence of events resulting in the school’s racial
composition reveals a discriminatory purpose; [and]
C. departures from the normal substantive or procedural sequence of
decision making, as evidenced, for example, by the legislative or
administrative history of the acts in question, especially if there are
contemporary statements by district officials, or minutes or reports of
meetings that demonstrate a discriminatory purpose.
MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1(A)–(C) (2007).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss3/2

26

Hobday et al.: A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota's Failed Experiment with Choice-b

962

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:3

157

discriminatory purpose.
In support of this standard, the state
cites to United States Supreme Court decisions that review the type
of harm that federal courts must find before ordering a state to
158
remedy a constitutional violation.
Eighth Circuit law recognized a much broader definition of
intentional discrimination than the Minnesota rules do. In United
States v. School District of Omaha, the Eighth Circuit announced a
presumption of an intent to segregate when “school authorities have
engaged in acts or omissions, the natural, probable and foreseeable
159
consequence of which is to bring about or maintain segregation.”
Quoting from the Second Circuit, which recognized a similar
presumption, the court explained the underlying rationale for the
rule:
To say that the foreseeable must be shown to have
been actually foreseen would invite a standard almost
impossible of proof save by admissions.
When we
consider the motivation of people constituting a school
board, the task would be even harder, for we are dealing
with a collective will. It is difficult enough to find the
collective mind of a group of legislators. It is even harder
to find the motivation of local citizens, many of whom
would be as reluctant to admit that they have racial
prejudice as to admit that they have no sense of humor.
Speaking in [d]e jure terms does not require us, then,
to limit the state activity which effectively spells
segregation only to acts which are provably motivated by a
desire to discriminate. Aside from the difficulties of
157. Id., subp. 1. These two factors are:
D. whether the racial composition of the school is the result of acts which
disadvantage one race more than another, as evidenced, for example,
when protected students are bused further or more frequently than
White students; and
E. whether the racially identifiable composition of the school was
predictable given the policies or practices of the district.
Id., subp. 1(D)–(E).
158. SONAR, supra note 101, at 36–37 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro.
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1997); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S.
449 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
159. U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 535–36 (8th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975). The court acknowledged that two other circuits
recognized a similar presumption. Id. at 536 (citing Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd. of
Educ., N.Y. Sch. Dist. No. 21, 512 F.2d 37, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Mich.
State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1974)).
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ferreting out a collective motive and conversely the
injustice of ascribing collective will to articulate remarks
of particular bigots, the nature of the “state action” takes
160
it quality from its foreseeable effect.
The Omaha decision arose in a context particularly relevant to
Minnesota—it was a school desegregation case in a northern state
that had never engaged in slavery or had state-mandated
segregation. The court still found intentional discrimination based
161
Minnesota’s
on the foreseeable effects of the state’s decisions.
explanation for its definition of intentional segregation ignored
Omaha altogether.
162
Ultimately, Minnesota adopted the rules in 1999.
In the
process, it drew national attention on the question of choice-based
integration. Opponents of mandatory racial integration rules
looked to the work of David Armor and Christine Rossell in
support of their claims that integrated education does not lead to
163
improved academic achievement and that mandatory integration
160. Id. (quoting Hart, 512 F.2d at 50 (citations omitted)).
161. Id. at 537. In light of Supreme Court developments, including Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v.
Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the
Eighth Circuit twice reconsidered the Omaha decision. Both times it affirmed its
finding of intentional segregation based on the foreseeable effects of the state
action. See U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of Omaha, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977) (Omaha III)
(en banc, per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978); U.S. v. Sch. Dist. of
Omaha, 541 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1976) (Omaha II).
162. The following sections were added or altered in 1999: MINN. R. 3535.0100,
3535.0130, 3535.0150, 3535.0160, and 3535.0170. See 24 Minn. Reg. 77–78 (July 6,
1999).
163. Armor visited Minnesota in June 1994 to give an address at a Center of
the American Experiment Luncheon Forum and speak at a roundtable with
legislators, school superintendents, and members of the State Board of Education.
KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 123, at 8. Kersten claims that Armor’s visit
“first alerted many Minnesotans to the shortcomings of the . . . failure of racebased busing as a vehicle for improving minority academic performance.” Id. at 9
(discussed in the author’s Acknowledgments). Kersten relies extensively on his
then-forthcoming book, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law, in her
critique of the Roundtable’s work. Id. at 5 (discussing Armor’s review of social
science research as casting “serious doubt on whether busing actually produces
significant gains for minority children.”). These same experts were cited as part of
the most recent Supreme Court debate, at least in the back-and-forth between
Justices Thomas and Breyer in their Parents Involved opinions. Parents Involved in
Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2777–78 (2007) (Thomas, J.
concurring); id. at 2821 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Thomas notes the scholarly
debate about the educational benefits of racial balancing and cites to Armor and
Rossell’s work as an example of some who conclude that there are “no
demonstrable educational benefits.” Id. at 2776 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
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164

does not work.
Gary Orfield served both as a consultant to the
165
and later testified against the proposed rules,
Roundtable
predicting that they would take “huge steps backward” in
166
Minnesota’s efforts to desegregate its schools.
IV. MINNESOTA’S RULES PERMIT SEGREGATIVE SCHOOL
ATTENDANCE DECISIONS
Minnesota’s decision to implement the current rules has had
very real consequences for its schools. The rules, while certainly
permitting districts to make pro-integrative decisions, do not
mandate or even affirmatively support such decision-making. They
also do not explicitly prohibit districts from making decisions about
school attendance boundaries or school closings that, in effect,
Armor & Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the Public Schools, in BEYOND THE
COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 239, 251 (A.
Thernstrom & S. Thernstrom eds. 2002)). Breyer cites to Armor’s Forced Justice as
a counter-example to the studies that find a positive correlation. Id. at 2821
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. The SONAR relies on Rossell’s and Armor’s combined work to support
adopting a voluntary approach. SONAR, supra note 101, at 54 (citing Christine
Rossell and David Armor, The Effectiveness of School Desegregation Plans, 1968–1991,
24 AM. POL. Q. 267 (1996)). The SONAR also cites to Rossell and other social
scientists for the opinion that “massive bussing and similar mandatory forms of
desegregation can lead to significant white flight, which lessens the opportunity to
maximize the benefits associated with desegregation.” Id. at 6 n.5. Rossell served
as a consultant to the state agency and testified at the administrative hearing in
support of Minnesota’s new rules. Testimony of Christine Rossell, Hearing
Transcript In re Proposed Adoption of Rules Relating to Desegregation 50–59 (Jan. 20,
1999) (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ.). Rossell testified that the rules’
reliance on voluntary techniques “are more likely to achieve greater, and
ultimately more lasting, school integration than the previous rule was able to
obtain.” Id. at 52.
165. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
166. In the Matter of the Proposed Adoption of Rules Relating to Desegregation:
Hearings Before the State of Minn. Dep’t of Children, Families and Learning, 145 (1999)
(testimony of Gary Orfield) (on file with authors). Orfield describes the rules as
“Swiss cheese of obfuscation that really [have] no goals, that have no means of
getting there, no resources, and . . . ludicrous definitions of desegregation and a
shift from looking at segregation as a problem per se to looking at only provable
intentional segregation [as] something that can be regulated.” Id. In particular,
he critiqued the rules’ definition of segregation because of its reliance on district
and adjacent district populations, as opposed to the metropolitan-wide school
populations, as the relative comparison. Id. at 145–46, 150. He further critiqued
Minnesota’s requirement of a finding of intentional discrimination before
triggering any kind of mandatory action and predicted that “there’s unlikely to be
any kind of action since it requires large resources to prove intent in the school
segregation context.” Id. at 146–47.
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create racially isolated schools. Instead, Minnesota’s rules leave the
desegregation of racially isolated schools up to the will of local
school boards, which face immense political pressure to maintain
racial boundaries. Likewise, the rules do not give the Minnesota
Department of Education the tools to force school districts to
desegregate schools unless the state can prove that the district
167
intended to discriminate against students of color.
The rules
effectively make the Department a perfunctory bureaucracy,
dutifully collecting data and noting whether schools and districts
are racially isolated. The rules do not provide the Department with
any mechanism for supporting positive, integrative action by school
boards, and they do not give the Department any power to prevent
decisions that effectively increase racial segregation in its schools.
The Department’s inability to act, while not solely responsible
for the growing racial isolation of students of color in Minnesota’s
schools, has at least permitted this regressive trend. Two school
districts’ recent experiences illustrate just how ineffective the
current rules are in promoting and enforcing pro-integrative
decisions. Hopkins, a Twin Cities suburban school district,
attempted to desegregate its elementary schools but because the
rules provided no specific guidance and did not trigger the
Department’s involvement whatsoever, it ultimately adopted
168
In
attendance boundaries that further segregated its schools.
Apple Valley, another Twin Cities suburban district, the rules did
nothing to remedy an attendance boundary that caused children of
color to be bused from a trailer park past several white elementary
169
schools to the racially isolated elementary school.
A. Rules Provide No Support for Integrative Boundaries: The Hopkins
Experience
School boards that choose to draw integrative school
attendance boundaries find little support from the Department. In
fact, until recently, based on its reading of the rules, the
Department “strongly discouraged” school districts from using
racial measures in their desegregation plans and warned districts
that “race-based measures have been successfully challenged in

167.
168.
169.

MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007).
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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170

several other states.”
Without a state mandate to integrate,
school districts have largely chosen to pay lip service to integration,
171
Across the country, school
while maintaining separate schools.
boards that have chosen to integrate schools have faced immense
opposition from communities that believe integrated schools will
lower property values, subject white students to inferior educations,
172
Historically,
and drive white families out of the school district.
school boards that have supported desegregation in the face of
vocal community opposition have often not been reelected, a
strong disincentive for board members to undertake non-mandated
173
desegregation efforts.
The lack of any mandate in Minnesota’s rules is most obvious
when school districts need to close or open schools. The rules do
not give the Department the power to prevent attendanceboundary decisions that will have a segregative effect on a district’s
174
Without a mandate to integrate schools, and with
schools.
parental pressure to maintain separate schools, school boards often
simply choose the path of least resistance and redraw school
boundaries in ways that increase segregation. The story of the
Hopkins School District illustrates how school districts can create
racial segregation by bowing to public pressure and why mandatory
integration rules are necessary to prevent continuing racially
segregative school-boundary decisions.
The Hopkins School District is a medium-sized, relatively
affluent district located west of Minneapolis. Like most Twin Cities
170. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r, to John Currie,
Superintendent, Dist. 196 n.1 (June 11, 2004) (on file with authors); letter from
Cindy Lavorato, Assistant Comm’r, to L. Chris Richardson, Superintendent, Osseo
Public Sch. n.1 (Feb. 4, 2000) (on file with authors); letter from Cindy Lavorato,
Assistant Comm’r, to Carol Johnson, Superintendent, Minneapolis Sch. Dist. n.1
(Jan. 14, 2000) (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ. and the Inst. on Race and
Poverty).
171. See, e.g., Thandiwe Peebles, Minneapolis Public Schools, Comprehensive
Desegregation/Integration Plan and Budget 5 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.mpls.k12.mn.us/sites/f7071225-9844-4da6-96c0996b9c74b221/uploads/Desegregration.pdf (stating that the district is committed
to racial integration, but refusing to consider North-South busing of students,
even though the overwhelmingly majority of black and Latino schools on the
north side of the city could easily be integrated with the very white schools directly
to their south).
172. See E. J. K. III, White Flight as a Factor in Desegregation Remedies: A Judicial
Recognition of Reality, 66 VA. L. REV. 961 (1980).
173. M. Stephen Weatherford, The Politics of School Busing: Contextual Effects and
Community Polarization, 42 J. OF POL. 747, 747 (1980).
174. See MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007).
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districts, Hopkins encompasses parts of several suburbs, ranging
from middle-income Golden Valley to wealthier Edina and
Minnetonka. Like many suburban districts, Hopkins has an
increasing population of students of color, and these students are
concentrated in the City of Hopkins, which has one of the regions
175
In 2005,
highest concentrations of subsidized housing units.
Hopkins’ Katherine Curren Elementary School qualified as racially
176
Katherine Curren had a
isolated under Minnesota’s rules.
student-of-color enrollment 46% higher than the district
elementary school average, due in part to the district’s earlier
decision to assign students living in a new public housing
177
In early 2006, facing a continued
development to this school.
decline in enrollment and severe budget constraints, Hopkins
decided to close Katherine Curren and to redistribute the Curren
178
In the wake of the school
students to other elementary schools.
closing, Hopkins considered four options for redrawing school
175. Letter from Diane Cowdery, Adm’r, Hopkins Office of Equity and
Integration, to Cindy Jackson, Minn. Dep’t of Educ. attachment 2 (June 20, 2005)
(on file with authors). One of the reasons student-of-color populations are
increasing in districts like Hopkins is that the Twin Cities regional government,
the Metropolitan Council, has done a fairly good job of locating new subsidized
housing units in higher-income suburbs. Myron Orfield, Nick Wallace, Eric Myott,
and Geneva Finn, Governing the Twin Cities, in REGION: LAW, POLICY, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE TWIN CITIES (Myron Orfield & Thomas Luce eds.) (forthcoming
2009) (manuscript at 42, on file with authors).
176. Letter from Diane Cowdery, supra note 175, at 1.
177. Id. at 1, 2, 8. In 1997, Minnetonka Mills, a public housing development
was built in the attendance area of Eisenhower Elementary School in the Hopkins
School District. Id. at 8. Before families moved into the complex, the school
district decided that these students would be bused out of their local elementary
school zone to attend Katherine Curren Elementary School. Id. This decision
resulted in an influx of students of color into the small elementary school. Id. In
explaining its decision, Hopkins stated, “[w]e believe the answer to the
achievement gap lies not in the counting and moving of students from one school
to another, but rather, in creating the conditions for equality and excellence in
every Hopkins school.” Id. at 2. The school district asserted that it made the
decision to bus the low-income students across attendance zones because of
concerns that the incoming families would overcrowd Eisenhower Elementary
School. Id. at 8.
178. Susan Scharebroich, Hopkins Forgoes Some of Its Budget-Saving Measures; The
Hopkins School District Stepped Back Slightly from the Aggressive Budget Cuts It Had
Planned, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis) Dec. 27, 2006, at 16W; Jason McGrew-King,
Enrollment Decline Means Less Revenue for Hopkins Schools, LAKESHORE WKLY. NEWS,
Nov. 7, 2005 available at http://www.weeklynews.com/main.asp?SectionID=
10&SubSectionID=10&ArticleID=2745. Hopkins discovered a $600,000 shortfall in
its budget in addition to a preexisting negative general fund balance of
$3,3873,738. Id. Hopkins Sch. Bd., Meeting Minutes, Nov. 16, 2007.
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attendance boundaries, the most integrative of which would have
dramatically increased the number of students of color at Glen
Lake Elementary, the school with the greatest concentration of
179
white students and the lowest poverty level school in the district.
The most segregative option assigned most of the students of color
at Alice Smith and Eisenhower Elementary, the second and third
180
most racially diverse schools in Hopkins.
A vocal group of Glen Lake parents who opposed an influx of
minority students into their school, and a small group of Katherine
Curren parents who had hoped to save their school, opposed the
181
For example, one Hopkins parent
most integrative option.
warned the school district that it would experience a “financial
loss” due to losing students to open enrollment if it chose the most
integrative option—a thinly veiled threat to remove students from
182
Hopkins schools if the Board sent students of color to Glen Lake.
The integration rules did not mandate that the Board choose an
183
integrative option. The school board ultimately chose the school
attendance boundary that the vocal parents wanted, but that
184
Today, 46% of Eisenhower’s
produced the least integration.
students are children of color, while Glen Lake, which is adjacent
185
Likewise, 43% of Eisenhower’s
to Eisenhower, is 91% white.
students receive free or reduced lunches as compared to only 6%
186
With this concentration of low-income
of Glen Lake’s students.
students of color, Eisenhower’s standardized test scores are also
179. HOPKINS SCHOOL DISTRICT BOUNDARY TASK FORCE, BOUNDARY OPTIONS FOR
BOARD OF EDUCATION CONSIDERATION (Feb. 2007).
180. Id. Each of the four proposals, however, assigned students who lived in
the Minnetonka Mills public housing development to Eisenhower. Id. Concerns
about hazardous traffic between the school and subsidized housing, which had
justified the discontinuous attendance boundary in 1997, were not even raised. Id.
181. Transcript of Hopkins School Board Meeting of Feb. 15, 2007 (statement
of Danny Kaplan and Brian Beek, parents) (opposing the influx of students into
Glen Lake) (on file with authors). Interview by Sarah Crangle with Emily WallaceJackson, Katherine Curren parent (March 2007) (stating that some Katherine
Curren parents of color opposed sending their students to a school that they
perceived as hostile to students of color).
182. Transcript of Hopkins School Board Meeting of Feb. 15, 2007 (statement
of Danny Kaplan, parent) (on file with authors).
183. See MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007).
184. Patricia Releford, Hopkins New District Map Will Relocate the Fewest Students,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb, 21, 2007, at 3W.
185. Minnesota Department of Education Report Cards for Eisenhower and
Glen Lake Elementary Schools for the 2006–2007 School Year,
http://education.state.mn.us/ReportCard2005.
186. Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2009

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 2

2009]

CHOICE-BASED INTEGRATION IN EDUCATION

969

about ten points lower than Glen Lake’s in both math and
187
reading.
The Minnesota Department of Education’s Office of
Integration/Desegregation did not officially weigh in on the battle
in Hopkins. In fact, there is no reason why the Department should
have been aware of the boundary change. While Hopkins was
required to report its schools’ student-of-color population, it was
188
not required to report potential attendance-boundary changes.
Even if the Department had been aware of the boundary changes,
the rules do not give the Department the power to prevent the
drawing of segregated boundaries. The rules only permit an afterthe-fact review of the redistricting decision, and even then, the
Department can only step in when there is proof that the school
189
district’s boundaries were motivated by a discriminatory purpose.
The possibility of an after-the-fact review of attendance-boundary
decisions does not provide a sufficient counterbalance to the
community’s resistance to integration—even when school boards
are generally supportive of integration.
B. Rules Do Not Prohibit Segregative Boundaries: The Apple Valley
Experience
The rules’ requirement of a finding of discriminatory intent
has effectively tied the Department’s hands. The Department has
never mandated that a school district change a decision that had a
segregative effect, even when the effect is extreme and the solution
readily apparent. A decision by the Apple Valley School District, a
wealthy suburban district south of Minneapolis and St. Paul,
illustrates this fact. The rules did not authorize the state to
intervene even when the school district was busing elementary

187. Id.
188. See MINN. R. 3535.0120 (2007).
189. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1 (2007). There is no evidence that Hopkins’
administrators intended to discriminate against students of color. And even if they
did, proving such discriminatory intent, which is usually unspoken and socially
unacceptable, would be nearly impossible. The Supreme Court has recognized
that proving a school district’s intent may be an insurmountable task. For
instance, in Keyes, the seminal northern school desegregation case, the Supreme
Court set the standard for intentional segregation in northern schools. Keyes v.
Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 206 (1972). In Keyes, the
Supreme Court allowed the plaintiffs to present a prima facie case of intent to
segregate, which the defendant school district was then required to rebut with
proof that an intent to segregate did not motivate its decision-making. Id.
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school children in a racially segregative manner. Until 2007, the
Apple Valley school district bused students from the Cedar Grove
Manufactured Housing Park, a high-poverty neighborhood in
Apple Valley with a disproportionate number of families of color,
across the school district to Cedar Grove Elementary School, the
school with the highest student-of-color population in the
190
Cedar Grove students were bused past several largely
district.
white, high-income schools to the low-income and increasingly
191
Although the Department recognized
segregated Cedar Grove.
that the attendance boundary was glaringly segregative and pushed
the district to remedy the attendance boundary, the Department
192
was unable to force the school district to act.
The Department notified the district that Cedar Park
Elementary School qualified as racially isolated under Minnesota’s
193
rules in the spring of 2004. The state required the school district
190. See letter from Mary Ann Nelson and Morgan Brown, Minn. Dep’t of
Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Sept. 24, 2004) (on
file with authors) (notifying the district that the Minnesota Department of
Education was concerned about the violation of state laws and demanding
information about the decision to draw the current attendance boundaries and
the racial impact of the disconnected attendance boundary); letter from Morgan
Brown, Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Don
Brundage & Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov. 18, 2004) (on file with
authors) (requesting the same information as discussed supra).
191. Maps that show the racial composition and percentage of students who
receive free and reduced lunch at District 196 are on file at the Institute on Race
and Poverty. See also letter from Alice Seagren, Comm’r of Educ., Minn. Dep’t of
Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (April 25, 2005) (on
file with authors) (stating that children from the Cedar Grove trailer park were
mostly children of color and were bused to Cedar Park, despite the fact that the
Department found six closer elementary schools).
192. See e-mail from Marceline Dubose, to Cindy Jackson and Morgan Brown,
Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (Nov. 17, 2004, 09:48 CST) (on file with authors) (stating
that the school districts were in the process of “thinking about” attendance
boundaries and that “[t]heir [the school district’s] background analysis of the
causes of the racial isolation is insufficient at best”); letter from Morgan Brown,
Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Don Brundage
and Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov. 18, 2004) (on file with authors)
(stating that the Minnesota Department of Education had additional concerns
about the Cedar Grove attendance boundary); e-mail from Sharon Peck, Program
Finance, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to Cindy Jackson (May 18, 2005, 02:58 CST) (on
file with authors) (containing District 196’s unofficial school board update stating
that the school district would begin the process of reviewing Cedar Park’s
attendance boundary next year and stating that “[w]e rarely get this sort of
‘meaty’ information in this type of email. (i.e., review of attendance
boundaries).”).
193. In 2004, the Board set up a community collaboration council, and
conducted focus groups on increasing “cultural diversity” and closing the
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to develop an integration plan that “increased interracial contact”
194
between students, but the state, as usual, warned the district
against remedying segregation by using “race-based measures”
because such measures had been “successfully challenged in many
195
The Department requested information from the
other states.”
district about the causes of the school’s racial isolation, including
information on the noncontiguous attendance boundary, but it did
196
In
not find a discriminatory purpose on the part of the district.
fact, the rules explicitly prohibit the Department from finding
intentional segregation based solely on situations “when protected
students are bused further or more frequently than white
197
The school district’s rule-mandated integration plan
students.”
did not promise to remedy the Cedar Grove/Cedar Park
198
And the district continued to bus
discontinuous boundary.
achievement gap. Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, Community Collaboration Council
Minutes, July 22, 2004–Oct. 14, 2004 (on file with the Minn. Dep’t of Educ.). The
collaboration council minutes do not discuss the Cedar Grove attendance
boundaries. Id.
194. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r Office of Academic
Excellence, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch.
Dist. 196 (June 11, 2004) (on file with authors).
195. Id.
196. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson & Morgan Brown, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to
John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Sept. 24, 2004) (on file with
authors); letter from Morgan Brown, Div. of Sch. Choice & Innovation Dir., Minn.
Dep’t of Educ., to Don Brundagegug & Jane Berenz, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (Nov.
18, 2004) (on file with authors); Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, School Board Meeting
Minutes (June 13, 2005) (on file with authors) (stating that the Minnesota
Department of Education had not found intentional discrimination on the part of
the district).
197. MINN. R. 3535.0130, subp. 1(D) (2007).
198. The whole of the district plan was to establish a task force that would
address district boundaries over the next two years. See Indep. Sch. Dist. 196,
Integration/Education Equity Plan for 2004–2006 (on file with authors). The
plan included the following with respect to district boundaries:
• Explore all options.
• Engage all segments of the community in a dialogue.
• Determine solutions that are strategic, fair and equitable.
• Establish task force to begin the 2005–06 school year to evaluate existing
elementary attendance boundaries and issues associated with boundaries
to include but not limited to integration. Task force will make
recommendations to Superintendent and School Board in March or
April of 2006.
• Approved recommendation to be implemented for the 2006–07 school
year.
• Evaluation of implementation of recommendation and adjustment made
as needed for the 2007–08 [school year].
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students of color past several largely white, low-poverty, highperforming schools to Cedar Park. Nonetheless, the Department
199
approved the district’s integration plans for the next three years.
In short, while the Department would not—and functionally could
not—require white students to be bused to integrate schools, the
rules also did not allow the Department to prevent segregative
busing unless there was other evidence to support that such busing
was the result of the school district’s racially discriminatory intent.
Apple Valley eventually adopted new attendance boundaries
that allow newly entering Cedar Grove students to attend schools
other than Cedar Park, but there is no indication that the
Department was able to leverage anything other than public
opinion to pressure the district to desegregate the Cedar Grove
Elementary School. In the meantime, the Department awarded the
200
district $2.8 million in integration aid.
The rules’ requirement that the Department find proof that
the school district intentionally, discriminatorily segregated
students—which would be a clear-cut constitutional violation—
prior to mandating district action means that the state can
functionally do nothing about non-discriminatory segregation.
Racial segregation and its inevitable companion, economic
segregation, are harmful whether they result from the intentional,
pernicious, well documented acts of school administrators or by
accident. Limiting the state’s remedial action to situations where
the state and the district are liable for a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment does nothing to enhance the rights of Minnesota’s
students to an equal and equitable education. In the end, a
voluntary desegregation rule is only as strong as the state’s
commitment to equality and desegregation, and the initial drive to
desegregate schools often dries up in the face of concerted public
opposition. To have any real impact on the racial composition of
public schools, states must implement comprehensive, mandatory
Id. at 11–12.
199. Letter from Mary Ann Nelson, Assistant Comm’r Office of Academic
Excellence, Minn. Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch.
Dist. 196 (Aug. 29, 2005) (on file with authors) (stating approval for full
integration funding for the 2005–2006 year); letter from Alice Seagren, Minn.
Dep’t of Educ., to John Currie, Superintendent, Indep. Sch. Dist. 196 (April 25,
2005) (on file with authors) (stating approval for 2005 integration revenue
funding); Indep. Sch. Dist. 196, School Board Meeting Minutes (June 13, 2005)
(on file with authors) (stating approval of 2004 plan).
200. INTEGRATION REVENUE, supra note 82, at 32.
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integration rules that proactively require schools to prevent racial
imbalance and promote racial diversity in their schools.
V. STATES SHOULD MANDATE METRO-WIDE DESEGREGATION
CONSISTENT WITH KENNEDY’S GUIDANCE IN PARENTS INVOLVED
A strong state policy mandating integration is still possible
after Parents Involved. Although Kennedy joined in the Court’s
disapproval of the particular integration plans challenged in Parents
Involved, his concurring opinion provides specific guidance to states
seeking to address growing racial and economic isolation in their
201
Kennedy determined that both plans were
schools.
constitutionally deficient primarily because the districts made
student-assignment decisions on the basis of individual racial
classifications and could not establish that these plans were
202
But Kennedy
narrowly tailored to further any state interest.
explicitly endorsed states’ adoption of general polices to encourage
a diverse student body and explained that states are “free to devise
race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general way
and without treating each student in different fashion solely on the
203
Specifically, he
basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.”
suggested several mechanisms school boards may pursue, including
“strategic site selection of new schools” and “drawing attendance
zones with general recognition of the demographics of
204
Kennedy stated that although these
neighborhoods.”
mechanisms are race-conscious, they would not prompt a strictscrutiny review because they “do not lead to different treatment
based on a classification that tells each student he or she is to be
205
defined by race.” Rather, they allow decision-makers to consider
“the impact a given approach might have on students of different
206
races.”
207
Although many cases, like Milliken v. Bradley, limit the scope
of remedies that courts may impose upon a state, these decisions
do not address what a state, on its own initiative, may do to address
201. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738, 2788–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 2790–91.
203. Id. at 2792.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (barring metropolitan-wide, court-ordered
desegregation).
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racial isolation in its schools, even when caused by “de facto
segregation.” In fact, Kennedy’s endorsement of states’ creatively
addressing racial isolation is consistent with Milliken’s concern for
208
local autonomy.
With these specific suggestions in mind, and given its historic
commitment to progressive policies, Minnesota should move in a
new, more effective direction, at least with respect to the racial and
socioeconomic composition of its public schools. There is no
reason why other states should not move in that direction as well.
In particular, the rules should address all racial imbalance or
segregation by race, no matter what its cause. Kennedy’s opinion
confirms that states have a compelling interest in doing so and as a
practical matter, proving the subjective intent of collective decision209
making is nearly impossible and a waste of time and resources.
Minnesota would also benefit from reinstating its State Board of
Education to set more enduring, less politically impacted,
educational policy. But even with such an entity back in place, the
legislature could—as the Roundtable Draft did—require
coordination and cooperation between various administrative
agencies, including those that deal with housing, employment, and
transportation.
While many of the Roundtable’s proposals are worth revisiting,
including the proposal to reduce state funding to segregated
school districts, the proposal to create a special integration district
210
for the Twin Cities Metropolitan area shows the most promise.
In Minnesota, as in many states, segregation exists within and
between school districts. School districts with low concentrations of
students of color often border school districts with high
211
The reality of open
concentrations of students of color.
enrollment means that white students often “flee” school districts
with high numbers of students of color to school districts with a
larger percentage of white students, which in turn compounds
segregation. Moreover, when school districts attempt to integrate
schools, white families often threaten to open-enroll their children
outside of the school district. After Parents Involved, it is an open
208. See id. at 741–42.
209. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2791–93 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. See ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109.
211. This between-district segregation is highly related to residential
segregation. See Kendra Bischoff, School District Fragmentation and Racial Residential
Segregation: How do Boundaries Matter?, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 182, 182–83 (2008).
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question whether states can limit students’ ability to participate in
open-enrollment programs to prevent the programs from having a
212
As the Roundtable recognized fifteen years
segregative effect.
ago, any effective desegregation plan will have to encompass the
213
Integrated schools are possible, even after
metropolitan region.
Parents Involved, if states adjust school district attendance
boundaries to maximize integrated school attendance zones.
Likewise, states can require school districts to coordinate by sharing
students, buildings, and transportation resources to minimize costs
and maximize integration.
Minnesota’s experiment with integration as an educational
choice has resulted in countless missed opportunities to improve
educational opportunities for all Minnesota children. The state has
failed to act as more and more schools become segregated, highpoverty schools and then chastened these schools for their
214
Segregated schooling has led, and will
“achievement gap.”
continue to lead, to a divided future of “haves” and “have-nots” as
more low-income children and children of color never have the
opportunity to make the social connections necessary to attain a
middle-class future. The state’s rationale for inaction in the face of
glaring racial disparities has been that only intentional
215
In reality, segregation harms
discrimination is actionable.
children no matter what the decision-maker intended. To ensure
an equitable future for all Minnesota’s children, the state’s mission
must be to prevent foreseeable segregation and remedy existing
racial imbalances, regardless of the school district’s intentions.
As the Supreme Court recognized nearly forty years ago,
desegregation cannot be considered merely a “choice” left up to
212. See Fisher v. U.S., No. CV 74-90 TUC DCB, 2007 WL 2410351, at *11 (D.
Ariz. 2007). Minnesota’s current open enrollment statute actually makes it easier
for students to transfer out of racially isolated school districts by lifting application
deadlines for students applying to transfer into or out of racially isolated school
districts. MINN. STAT. § 124D.03, subdiv. 4(b)–(c) (2006).
213. ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (Feb. 1994), supra note 109, at 3.
214. See Emily Johns & James Walsh, STUDENT TEST SCORES: Slight Gains, but
Sanctions List Grows; More Schools Will Face Federal Penalties Because They Didn’t
Improve Enough, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), June 30, 2008, at A1 (quoting Alice
Seagren, who stated that she was not satisfied with the achievement gap). Alice
Seagren, the current Commissioner of Education, was the head of the GOP task
force that called for the rejection of the Roundtable rule on the claim that
desegregation is based on ideas that have not worked in other states and will not
work in Minnesota. See Debra O’Connor, GOP Task Force Rejects Desegregation Plan,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 8, 1995, at 3B.
215. SONAR, supra note 101, at 50–51.
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216

the individual inclinations of families and school districts.
Minnesota’s experience shows that the failure to mandate
integration leads to growing numbers of segregated schools. There
is no real question that integration in education constitutes a
compelling interest. As our society has grown more multiracial and
multicultural, the need for integrated schools has only grown. At a
minimum, students need to sit next to students from other racial
backgrounds in the classroom in order to understand each other—
a necessary step in building a fair and equitable future.

216. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 21 (1971);
Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968).
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